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My comment on the Legitimacy of Intervention has two interrelated parts. The first
part is of a general nature and concerns the problem of the justification of legitimate
intervention. The second part will address the main theme of the paper by Frederick
Schauer (2014), i.e., the problem of intervention under conditions of epistemic and
normative uncertainty. My comment will be based on a philosophical puzzle which
is called the Münchhausen Trilemma.
The Baron von Münchhausen was a German nobleman who lived in the 18th
century and has become famous as a storyteller. In one of his famous stories he
managed to pull himself and the horse on which he was sitting out of a swamp by
his own hair. It was the German philosopher Hans Albert who first drew attention
to how this story by Münchhausen is analogous to the following situation, which is
typical not only of epistemology, but also of ethics and political philosophy.
The search for truth or other values seems to be inseparably tied to the search for
secure ground, for an absolute foundation or an ultimate justification. The search for
an Archimedean point, the quest for an ultimate justification of values is a manifes-
tation of the vain quest for certainty originating in the idea of a positive, sufficient
justification. This general philosophical idea, operative both in epistemology and
philosophy of science as well as in ethics and political philosophy, mandates the
quest for an adequate foundation, a sufficient justification, for all convictions and
principles. The demand for a justification of everything leads to a situation with three
alternatives, all of which are unacceptable: the Münchhausen Trilemma, named such
because of the analogy existing between this problem and one which that baron once
had to solve in the story mentioned above. It is a situation characterized by three
alternatives, all of them seemingly unacceptable or in other words a trilemma.
“One must choose [...] between
(1) an infinite regress, which seems to arise from the necessity to go further and
further back in the search for foundations, and which, since it is in practice
impossible, affords no secure basis;
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(2) a logical circle in the deduction, which arises because, in the process of jus-
tification, statements are used which were characterized before as in need of
foundation, so that they can provide no secure basis; and finally
(3) the breaking-off of the process at a particular point, which, admittedly, can
always be done in principle, but involves an arbitrary suspension of the principle
of sufficient justification.
Since both an infinite regress and a circular argument seem clearly unacceptable,
one is inclined to accept the third possibility, for the simple reason that no other way
out of the situation is thought to be possible. Of statements where one is prepared
to break off the foundation process, it is customary to use words such as ‘self-
evident,’ ‘self-authenticating,’ ‘based upon immediate knowledge’ – upon intuition
or experience that is – or in some other way to render palatable the fact that one is
prepared to break off the foundation regress at some particular point and suspend
the foundation postulate with respect to this point, declaring it to be an Archimedian
point (of knowledge). [...] If such a conviction or statement is called a dogma, then
our third possibility is revealed as something one would have least expected in
a solution to the foundation problem: justification by recourse to a dogma.” (Albert,
1985, pp. 18f).
Such dogmatism, and the Münchhausen Trilemma more generally can be avoided
by substituting the principle of critical examination for the principle of sufficient
justification. In accord with this principle, a discussion of the problems of episte-
mology, philosophy of science, or ethics need not refer back to ultimate reasons in
order to be convincing or “rational.” Instead, problems that arise in the sphere of
cognition or in the sphere of praxis are to be discussed and solved in light of the
already existing solutions. Solutions to new types of problems of any sort require
creativity and imagination and are not worked out in a social and mental vacuum.
The application of the principle of critical examination means that solutions are to
be creatively discovered, they are to be weighed in reference to certain values and
standards, and, on this basis, the preferred solutions to problems are to be decided
upon. Solutions are not judged to be good or rational by virtue of being based on
certain knowledge or ultimate values. Instead, our solutions in all areas of cognition
and action are fallible, but they can be improved by critical discussion.
Though not all discussions can be found guilty of committing the crime, so to
say, of a quest for ultimate justification – they simply ask for justification without
assuming that this should be final – the quest for ultimate foundations still remains
implicitly given. It is, thus, important to stress that to the question posed in the
symposium: “What makes intervention legitimate?” the only sensible answer is:
“Nothing”, if the question is supposed to have a satisfactory answer only in the case
of the provision of an ultimate justification for legitimacy.
Now let me come to my more specific comment on the paper of Frederick Schauer,
which is also tied to the Münchhausen Trilemma. The central theme of Schauer’s
paper, very nicely encapsulated in the opening phrase of his contribution, is that
“Decisions about intervention are decisions made under conditions of uncertainty”
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(Schauer, 2014, section 1). As he himself claims “The goal of this paper is to
examine the question of intervention in light of the fact that decisions to intervene
and decisions not to intervene may each turn out to have been the wrong decision”
(section 1). In a sense, thus, the general framework within which his arguments
unfold is a fallibilistic framework. This is perfectly clear, I think, with respect to
what Schauer propitiously calls epistemic uncertainty.1 His proposal to deal with the
pervasive epistemic uncertainty is by means of following what he calls the principle
of epistemic modesty, and his arguments for introducing such a principle are very
convincing indeed.
However, Schauer excludes from his analysis the possibility of normative uncer-
tainty, i.e. “uncertainty about the very reasons to intervene, as opposed to uncertainty
about the existence of triggering facts [...] under an accepted or internalized reason
to intervene” (section 8). This seems to me to be a serious shortcoming. As he
modestly states in the last paragraph of his paper, he characterizes his own project
more “as a prolegomenon to a model of tolerance and intolerance, or intervention
and non-intervention” (section 8) rather than as a full model. Insofar it is not fair to
expect that normative uncertainty is also paid full attention in this prolegomenon.
However, I think that fallibilism can and should also be easily extended to include
normative claims; articulating them at greater length would make the project an
even more successful one. So, let me close this short comment by giving the general
flavor of a fallibilistic position.
Fallibilism is the position that all our knowledge, activities, principles, positions,
and rules are prone to error. In all areas of cognition and action, human beings
constantly make mistakes, but they are able to learn from them. A fallibilist treats
all problem solutions as hypothetical: he provisionally accepts them instead of
searching for a final justification for them. The fallibilistic attitude can be applied
to all areas of human activity: science, politics, and even religion. (The existence
of God can be treated as a hypothetical postulate to be critically discussed, for
example.) In a nutshell, fallibilism is so productive because it treats all criteria and
values as hypotheses amenable to criticism and revisions – possibly progressive
ones.
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